Berkeley’s Mental Monism and James Joyce’s Conception of Authorship:
The Narrator-Character from A Portrait to “Proteus”

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As Anghinetti reports, “Joyce once confessed to Gide that art may even usurp corporeal experience.”¹ It is clear then that for Joyce aesthetic creation was not subordinated to external experience. Joyce’s staunch advocacy of conscious realism, rather than conscientious realism makes plain that fiction for him was recreation of a universe instead of a mere reflection of a pre-existing world.² Joyce’s idea of artistic creation as independent from material, external reality finds an epistemological basis in George Berkeley’s doctrine of mental monism, according to which the physical world is a fiction, a derived construct, and reality is fundamentally mental. This communion of external and internal realities is supported at a conceptual level by Stephen’s psychological and artistic development in A Portrait and later in Ulysses, and at a formal level by the merge of the narrator’s and character’s discourses in A Portrait and by narratological techniques of characterisation. In a reciprocal fashion, Stephen’s experience as an artist in the making sheds light on the creative process whereby Joyce’s works were brought to fruition. Thus, the author-God-of-his-creation and his character converge into a single fictional entity just as perceiving “spirits” and the all-encompassing “God” or “metamind”³ are parts of the same idealistic reality in Berkeley’s philosophy.

Tracing Stephen Dedalus’ psychological development in A Portrait and later in “Proteus” in Ulysses, we can discern his overwhelming willingness to transcend the immediacy of everyday experience. Eventually, this willingness is identified with the acquisition of an artistic conscience, which leads Stephen to formulate his aesthetic doctrine in the latter part of A Portrait. In his own words, “[t]he artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, paring his fingernails.”⁴ This assertion encapsulates the overriding narratological principle governing both A Portrait and Ulysses and epitomises Stephen’s struggle to find a theoretical foundation for his
artistic impetus. At the same time, Stephen’s statement is metafictionally indicative of the relation of interdependence holding between the author—and narrator, we may assume—of A Portrait and Stephen. The author-God’s narratological techniques, which can be thought of as equivalent to God’s work and language in the creation, mirror Stephen’s mental processes whereby he constructs his mental universe.

Within a semiotic framework, Weir argues that Stephen’s growth in comprehending the ways of his creator in terms of narrative strategies of structuring and characterisation parallels the “growth of the system as a whole within this text.” The completion of the author’s artistic construct parallels Stephen’s process of artistic and psychological development. Thence, it is arguable that A Portrait is a novel that constructs itself through his main (only?) character. From this standpoint, we can arrive at conclusions about Joyce’s own notions of artistic creation and vision by paying attention to Stephen’s development in the light of narratological techniques.

A preliminary observation we must make is that Stephen’s reality, which complies with the ontology of the Berkeleyan mental universe, is defined by the contents of his individual mind. This mental reality becomes fiction through language, which marks the different stages of Stephen’s mental and creative maturation. However, no one-to-one relationship between language and “ideas” can be posed. As Berkeley argues, in order for an individual “spirit” to have access to his “ideas,” he must avoid “the deception of words.” As our philosopher posits,

it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name . . . Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying a great number of particular ideas. (“Treatise” 16)

Given that language retrieves the information it provides from the individual’s “mind,” the meaning of the propositions conveyed through particular utterances “does not lie in the physical domain but in the perceptual, which indicates that a physical proposition is meant metaphorically, not literally” (Lloyd 10). This assertion is coherent with the Berkeleyan claim that the physical world is intrinsically unobservable, thus being indistinguishable from fiction. Hence, Stephen’s language in A Portrait denotes in some cases emotions, passions, or perceptual processes at work, while it consists of bleached signifiers in other cases. It is the parcels of his linguistic behaviour that are assembled to his psyche—rather than those being just conventional tokens—that are interesting when trying to look at the reciprocal connection between the author’s contriving of his
artistic work and the character’s act of founding his own artistic language and “mind.”

Referring to A Portrait, H. G. Wells once said that even though “A Portrait depicted Stephen’s growth ‘with extreme completeness,’” it was “‘a mosaic of jagged fragments.’” This shows how unconventional the structure of A Portrait is. Rather than the chronological linearity characteristic of the novel that fermented in the previous age, narrative elements such as thematic motifs or leitmotifs endow this work with structural unity. In addition to this, the elaboration of these leitmotifs provides evidence of Stephen’s mental make-up. These leitmotifs consist of “full” language, that is, language denoting “ideas” and revealing Stephen’s “spirit” in a Berkeleyan fashion:

[W]hat is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things [mind, spirit, soul, or myself] which perceive them. (“Treatise” 23)

Thus, the use of leitmotifs proves a revealing example of the identity between the author’s techniques to construct his novel and the character’s psychological evolution. These motifs are also the clues that lighten Stephen’s way to his eventual choice of art as vocation and art as life, which coincides with his vision of the girl wading in the sea in chapter 4. As Carens claims, “[t]he multiple strands of developmental thematic meaning traced here all coalesce in that vision, the culmination of the motifs of the green-red, rose, girl, water, and bird-flight.”

Leitmotifs may be based on colours, such as pink. As noted above, leitmotifs provide a channel into Stephen’s mind, which means that the perception of a colour on which a leitmotif is based automatically becomes an “idea” in Berkeley’s terms. According to him, “a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collection of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things” (“Treatise” 22). In the case of the colour-pink leitmotif in A Portrait, things become more complex because the “experientia,” that is “the elements that make up the contents of the conscious experience” (Lloyd 15), are not fixed and stable as in the case of the apple. The ultimate components of the blended idea denoted by the noun “pink” are the observation of the colour itself on the one hand and the perception of physical pleasure which leads to the sublimation of the senses over the intellect, on the other hand.

In chapter 2, Stephen ends up as a slave of his appetites once his sexual fantasies emerge in full strength. By squandering the academic prize he won, he indulges in sheer hedonism. The visual mark pointing to this
exaltation of pleasure is his painting his room in pink. “Then the season of pleasure came to an end. The pot of pink [my emphasis] enamel paint gave out and the wainscot of his bedroom remained with its unfinished and illplastered” (P 200).

The chapter finishes with Stephen’s encounter with a prostitute, which culminates his infatuation with sensual pleasures. Sex becomes his main concern and the overriding principle of his existence. This experimentation with sensual pleasures—or the foreshadowing of it—is again visually signalled by the colour-pink motif: “He stood still in the middle of the roadway, his heart clamouring against his bosom in a tumult. A young woman dressed in a long pink [my emphasis] gown laid her hand on his arm to detain him and gazed into his face” (P 202). Narratologically, this unifies thematically episodes otherwise scattered. Psychologically, the colour pink becomes an idea concomitant to sensual pleasure of any kind and the word “pink,” a signifier denoting this composite idea. Joyce’s masterful use of the modernistic possibilities of extended symbolic patterns or leitmotifs proves highly effective in the construction of the main character’s psyche and in the overall structuring of the novel. At the same time, these leitmotifs constitute enclaves in the very core of Stephen’s consciousness as an independent individual as well as the main threads that come together in the climatic epiphany in chapter 4. Thus, the technical strategies of the God of the creation that A Portrait consists of and the hallmarks of Stephen’s maturation as man and artist become circularly interconnected.

Another formal aspect that mirrors the merger of character and narrator—which, for practical purposes, we consider at one with the author-God-metamind of the fictional universe of A Portrait—is the type of discourse to which this extradiegetic narrator resorts in order to render Stephen’s consciousness: the narrated monologue or free indirect speech. This coalescence of the character’s and the teller’s voices further emphasises the creator’s signature upon his otherwise independent creation just in the same way as Berkeley’s metamind “excites” ideas in individual spirits. While Stephen’s discourse is embedded in this narrator’s discourse, “all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world . . . subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit” (“Treatise” 24).

The narrative voice is imitative of Stephen’s consciousness in the sense that it is on a par with the protagonist’s stage of psychological evolution. It moves from the childlike language on the opening pages to the theoretically complicated expositions in chapter 5. Hence, the novel does not feature a seamless narrative voice. On the contrary, we have a schizophrenic fusion of third-person narration and first-person point of view:

Once he had washed his hands in the lavatory of the Wicklow Hotel and his father pulled the stopper up by the chain after and the dirty water went down
through the hole in the basin. And when it had all gone down slowly the hole in the basin had made a sound like that: suck. Only louder. (P 110)

This passage is representative of Stephen’s early cognitive stage: he is starting to experience sounds and associate it to words, to construct his mental universe. This is formally represented by a predominance of the influence of the third person narrator over Stephen’s musings and a simplified syntax. In this passage, only the last two sentences are truly Stephen’s voice. Nevertheless, as Riquelme argues, “[t]he ambiguous merger of voices makes it difficult, even impossible, for the reader to distinguish between the cunningly combined voices of character and narrator.”

Running counter to Stephen’s psychological evolution and artistic self-awareness, we readers can experience a relaxation of the discursive influence of this third-person narrator. The textual markers that make this influence explicit tend to fade away:

While his soul had passed from ecstasy to languor where had she been? Might it be, in the mysterious ways of spiritual life, that her soul at those same moments had been conscious of his homage? It may be. (P 328)

These reflections, made after his composition of “The Villanelle of the Temptress” as he awakens from sleep in bed, are a clear exponent of Stephen’s progressive mental complexity as regards aesthetic issues. In contrast with the passage quoted above, this one dwells not so much on anecdotal aspects such as the hand-washing details above as on purely mental processes connected to Stephen’s newly acquired artistic consciousness. The alternation between an external world and the character’s mind seen in the first passage becomes less and less frequent in the latter sections of the book.

Formally, this increasing identification between narrator and character is marked by the growing liability of first person pronouns to substitute for third person ones. Instead of “his soul” we read “my soul.” Obviously, this phenomenon goes hand in hand with a greater occurrence of these pronouns and the lack of overt references to Stephen though such phrases as “to him” or “to Stephen” (Riquelme 58). In the passage concerning the composition of the villanelle, the language is identified as Stephen’s rather than the narrator’s. In respect of passages such as these, Riquelme argues that “the effect is to align the teller’s voice and the character’s, if only temporarily” (58).

Like the equation of converging symbolic leitmotifs with Stephen’s mental contents or “ideas”—mostly with those related to his budding conscience as an artist—the superposition of third person narration and first person perception stresses the piecemeal mixing of the narrator-author-
God-metamind and his character. The author is who really excites Stephen’s ideas: the latter lives in a fictional universe concocted by the former. In a Berkeleyan fashion, the author as the God or metamind of his creation “is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas” (“Treatise” 48). Stephen’s discourse and mental make-up tend to converge with the Author’s discourse and narrative techniques respectively, thus being both the subject of the novel and at the same time a metaphorising of the creative process leading up to the final narrative product, A Portrait. A corollary of this affinity is that Stephen strives to transcend his earthly experience and approach the divinity, a paternal, artistic conscience which is both nurturing source and fictional outcome of Stephen’s evolution as an artist.

Indeed, a unifying thrust in the novel is the protagonist’s constant search for the divinity. The lines Fleming scribbles in chapter 1: “Stephen Dedalus is my name/Ireland is my nation/Clongowes is my dwellingplace/And heaven my expectation” (P 115), set a train of thought in Stephen that leads him to entertain mindboggling theological notions:

That was he; and he read down the page again. What was after the universe? Nothing. But was there anything round the universe to show where it stopped before the nothing place began? It could be a wall but there could be a thin line there all round everything. It was very big to think about everything and everywhere. Only God could do that. He tried to think what a big thought that must be but he could thing only of God. (P 115)

Stephen’s path is not straight though. As suggested above, in chapter 2 the ruling principle in Stephen’s life is sensual pleasure. He soars over the moral and financial deterioration of his family, the differences with his conformist peers—particularly with his rival, Heron—and his amatory disappointment with E—C—by getting involved in sexual fantasies, and, eventually, by making love to a prostitute at the end of the chapter. The passage describing this encounter with the prostitute is coated by a language reminiscent of religious cult and mystic experience. As Stephen enters the ghostly neighbourhood where the encounter takes place, “[t]he yellow gasflames arose before his troubled vision against the vapoury sky, burning as if before an altar. Before the doors and in the lighted halls groups were gathered arrayed as for some rite” (P 202, my emphasis). Once he consummates the lovemaking act with the prostitute, he surrenders “himself to her, body and mind, conscious of nothing in the world but the dark pressure of their softly parting lips” (P 203). These lines have a certain mystic flavour. The divinity here is then embodied by the prostitute and the mystical experience is equated to sexual pleasure.

Shortly after this apotheosis, Stephen berates himself for his degradation: he has now fully surrendered to his own appetites. His guilt compels him to respond to the announcement of a retreat that is going to take place in
Belvedere. He now looks for redemption in “her whose emblem in the morning star, bright and musical, telling of heaven and infusing peace” (P 207), the Virgin Mary. If chapter 2 closed with his celebration of bodily voluptuousness and his worship of the prostitute as a godlike figure, chapter 3 evolves towards “[a] life of grace and virtue and happiness,” starting after the “ciborium had come to him” (P 248), and through his worship of the Virgin Mary. However, Stephen soon realises that he will not long resist “the insistent voices of the flesh” (P 254) and that he cannot submit to his self-imposed joyless curbing of the senses any longer. Again, he has failed to transcend his humanity, this time through formal religion.

In order to seek for the divinity, Stephen has followed two antagonistic paths: sex and mechanical penitence, both of which have proved ineffective. The former involved sheer sensuality and a total immersion in perceptive processes, the latter forced Stephen to sever himself from the surrounding world, thus striving “by constant mortification to undo the sinful past rather than to achieve saintliness with peril. Each of his senses was brought under a rigorous discipline” (P 252). The last two sections in chapter 4 offer his refusal of both paths. First, Stephen is able to refuse his masters’ offering to make him a recruit of the Jesuits. As he reckons that “he would fall silently, in an instant” from his state of spiritual purity, he “crossed the bridge over the stream of the Tolka and turned his eyes coldly for an instant towards the faded blue shrine of the Blessed Virgin” (P 264). Leaving behind the shrine in his wanderings symbolically points to his refusal of a religious life. Second, he cringes at the sight of the naked bodies of the cavorting swimmers as he makes his way to the diving stone where he sees the symbolic girl. “The mere sight of that medley of wet nakedness chilled him to the bone” (P 270), which evinces that he is no longer a slave to his body.

That these two courses of action show themselves inoperative to get to the divinity in the fictional reality of A Portrait hints at the fact that the God of this creation is not the Christian God. Similarly, total devotion to the senses hinders rather than facilitates Stephen’s satisfaction of his early thirst for the divine. Between these two ends of the same continuum, he eventually comes up with an eclectic method to achieve his ascetic end, that is, to understand the ways of his creator. As said above, reality in A Portrait, being fictional, complies with Berkeleyan ontology. Consequently, analysing Berkeley’s conception of “God” and his relation to individual “spirits,” we may throw some light on Stephen’s relation to the narrator-author. The mental contents of the individual spirits’ minds are totally dependent on the metaind:

When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view, and so likewise as to hearing and other senses; the
ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. (“Treatise” 35)

Given that Berkeley’s ontology is purely mental, God and individual spirit are parts of this fictional world. Thus, what we interpret as individual minds or spirits not only have identical properties to the consciousness of the metamind, they are one and the same thing as this consciousness. If Stephen identifies his own consciousness with his mental objects, his “ideas,” linguistically signified by the nouns designating the “denotata” of the leitmotifs, and if these signs are excited by the metamind, he should “from the constant uniform method of [his] sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds” (“Treatise” 57). Hence, Stephen should take on the role of natural philosopher so as to understand the Berkeleyan God of his creation-reality. He should not shun his senses away from the world, since he will only discover the ways of the metamind through his works, which reside entirely in the sensible world (the only possible one according to Berkeley’s natural philosophy). At the same time, Stephen, as a perceiving consciousness, should not become inseparable from his mental objects, which means that sheer sensuality is not the way to attain a sharp understanding of the divine. The revelation of the correct way comes under the form of an epiphany at the end of chapter 4.

While his father is trying to obtain some information about the university for Stephen, he impatiently departs, his walk eventually bringing him to a diving stone where he sees a girl wading in the sea. This passage of great lyric intensity can be considered the climax of the novel:

A girl stood before him in midstream: alone and still, gazing out to sea. She seemed like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird. Her long slender bare legs were delicate as a crane’s and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller and softest of ivory, were bared like featherings of soft white down. Her slateblue skirts were kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind her. Her bosom was a bird’s, soft and light; slight and soft as the breast of a dark plumaged dove. But her long fair hair was girlish; and girlish and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, her face. (p 274)

Stephen, an already committed artist, regards her as a symbol of his choice of life as art. Her mere sight imbibes him with a sacramental power akin to the Christian communion. But the religion of art tilts to neither of the extremes in which Stephen had indulged previously: unwitting hedonism and curbing of the senses. He should now mystically transcend his
everyday experience through the imitation of the spirit that has brought him forth. He should first accept his mortality and second create out of mortal materials. The girl is a virgin-like figure, though it differs from the Virgin Mary in having “mortal beauty.” Nonetheless, her role is the same as the Virgin’s in chapter 3, that is, being the cornerstone and symbol of Stephen’s vital philosophy. At the same time, the girl shares important aspects with the prostitute at the end of chapter 2, as her description makes plain. Therefore, the girl on the strand consists of the merger of the prostitute and the Virgin Mary: she is the culmination of the motif of the girl in the novel.

However, she is not only this, but also the unifying image of the different developmental symbolic strands of meaning bestowing structural unity on the novel and making up Stephen’s “spirit”: the motifs of the bird, water, etc. are fused in the girl. Thus, this is the climatic moment of the novel from a formal viewpoint and from the viewpoint of Stephen’s maturation as person and artist. As noted above, the formal techniques to which the narrator-author-God has recourse in order to shape his character’s “mind” in a Berkeleyan fashion, and the language which reveals Stephen’s “mind” in so far as “experientia” is denoted, become one and the same (fictional) thing: A Portrait—which we may more precisely regard as a self-portrait now. In Weir’s words, “[c]atching up with the verbal universe of which he is composed, Stephen Dedalus becomes cognizant of those techniques and operations which, through repetition and articulation, are Stephen Dedalus” (27). Thus, the girl is the unifying symbol of the novel as a whole and of Stephen’s “spirit.” When both converging realities fuse into one Stephen understands the ways of his God, an artist. After the envisioning of the girl, “Heavenly God! cried Stephen’s soul, in an outburst of profane joy” (P 274). His new religion, the religion of art, combines the profane and the divine in one, and his “Heavenly God” is not the Christian God, but an artistic one. As Brivic argues,

After Stephen is no longer devoted to God as such, he continues to be impressed by godlike psychological effects. His constant attempt to perceive the truth of his life, to put together the signs in which he is enclosed, is always striving to see an inner pattern, and that pattern reveals the pregnant void beneath it.12

Stephen final commitment to “go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of [his] soul [that which cried “Heavenly God!”] the uncreated conscience of [his] race” (P 360) is consistent with his understanding of his own existence.

To find this “reality of experience” is the main concern for a Stephen who is already convinced of his role as an artist in the “Proteus” episode of Ulysses. Even though Stephen sees himself as an artist now, and knows that
the only way to communion with the God of his creation is through art, he does not possess an epistemological foundation for his art yet. Bowen claims that “Proteus” “reflects his search for an identity through an aesthetic that will bridge the gap between his art and what he experiences in life as he raises fundamental questions regarding the nature of existence and his relationship to the world around him.”

At the very beginning of this episode, Stephen entertains notions of Aristotelian natural philosophy, reflecting on the flux and change of the world around him. In Aristotle, he tries to find the key to approach reality and re-create out of his own experience. Turning to the old Stagirite’s doctrine of internal causes whereby the essence of things is banished from human perception, and what appears to the senses are just accidents attached to matter, Stephen reflects on the “Limits of the diaphane.” “Diaphane” is Stephen’s translation of Greek “diaphanes,” usually translated as “transparent.” He goes on to think that “he [Aristotle] adds: in bodies.” As Thornton says, “Aristotle explains that what is visible is color, but the color must always be in some substratum which, while not visible per se, is visible by reason of its color.” Compliance with Aristotle’s contention that matter exists and does not depend for its existence on perception would mean that Stephen’s art would only be mimetic creation of a pre-existing world, a second-rate demiurgic act. In fact, Aristotle himself relegated literature (or poetry) to an imitative status: “[e]pic poetry, tragedy, and also comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most music on the flute and the lyre all fall into the general class of imitation.”

Acceptance of the Aristotelian doctrine would mean that Stephen as author would not be at one with his creation in the same way that he fuses with his author-narrator-God. Likewise, recognising the existence of an intrusive material substratum would make it impossible for the artist-philosopher to attain divine vision, since his perceptions would not equal the workings of the supreme Spirit or metamind. In Stephen’s linguistic world, the guidelines of artistic unity concocted by the metamind cannot be put to use if the existence of matter is acknowledged. Similarly, Stephen would never build his art upon the “reality of experience,” but on a reflection of it. In this respect, Anghinetti points out that

Berkeley’s attack on Cartesian rationalism and Lockean dichotomies of primary and secondary qualities permits the artist to encounter the reality of experience, not simply representational appearances of an inscrutable “thing-in-itself” hiding behind the veil of the diaphane. (318)

Thus, Stephen must stray from Aristotle if he is to fully understand the world in which he is immersed and to become an artist himself.

Searching for an epistemology appropriate to his artistic experience and a metamental language to give full vent to his unifying thirst, Stephen

76
constantly muses on images of merging circularity and integral communion. As he sees the cockle pickers walking along the sea he thinks:

What has she in the bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool. The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. That is why mystic monks. Will you be as gods? Hello. Kinch here. Put me to Edenville. Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one. (U 46)

The image of the navel is of great help to understand the connection between artistic unity of author and character in a Berkeleyan way. Riquelme points out that “[t]he navel is the point at which the umbilical cord has been cut. It suggest simultaneously the connection and the severing of the connection between parent and child, or, in aesthetic terms, between creator and artifact” (50). Similarly, Stephen reflects upon the theological consubstantiality of Father and Son. He uses this theological analogy to compare this infinite and eternal union to his own father, Simon, even though his remarks can be applied to his relation to his artistic father: “He willed me and now may not will me away or ever” (U 47). The God-author in A Portrait and Ulysses is the “Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature” (“Treatise” 36). This Spirit operates on Stephen’s mind through an act of will, which univocally connects him to Berkeley’s metamind. These images of unity and circular reciprocity herald Stephen’s eventual compliance with Bishop Berkeley’s reliance on a mental monism without an empirical reality that transcends “ideas.”

Leaving aside Aristotelian considerations of reality, Stephen eventually turns to Berkeley’s idealism:

The good bishop of Cloyne took the veil of the temple out of his shovel hat: veil of space with coloured emblems hatched on its field. Hold hard. Coloured on a flat: yes, that’s right. Flat I see, then think distance, near, far, flat I see, east, back. Ah, see now. (U 60)

Stephen applies Berkeley’s theory of a visual language coming from the metamind to his own perceptions. This triggers full comprehension of the metamental language and, consequently effects his adoption of Berkeley’s philosophy as a metaphor for his mystic-artistico experience and as an epistemological basis for his life as an artist. Now Stephen’s full picture as an artist is complete, the cycle has closed and character and narrator converge into one: it remains to see now if Stephen is able to construct out of experience and endow his art with the pure essence of reality. He has found the divine in his own perceptions. In Philonous’ words, “is there no difference between saying, ‘sensible things do really exist’ and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind or God?” Stephen has perceived his God, has read his language, “thought [it] through [his] eyes” (U 45), and is now ready to create himself.

77
In “Proteus” Stephen has learned that the artistic metamind to which he tends is to be looked for in the multiplicity of experience. The Berkeleyan model of God supplies Stephen with a convenient theoretical foundation to both be consistent with his own epiphanic perception of life as art and to promote artistic creation to the status of “reality of experience.” The formal texture of A Portrait and Ulysses, the construction of Stephen as person and artist, and the circular connection between metamind and the character’s “spirit” are supported by Berkeley’s philosophy and allows Joyce to claim artistic reality for his œuvre.

The source which nurtures art, experiential reality, is the only possible one. Thus, art is no longer subordinated to external, material reality as mimetic representation nor despised as a mere distorted reflection of the shadows of pure Platonic Ideas. Therefore, Joyce, through characterisation, style and structure both baptises Stephen as an artist and becomes anointed as creator of reality through his own character. Finnegans Wake, a linguistic festival, epitomises Joyce’s achievement of unity out of diversity, of the merger of narrator and character, father and son, artist and creation. In fact, it is the book of “Doublends Jined” (FW 20.16), a phrase that can be applied to Joyce’s works as a whole, tainted by an “emerald trail of seaweed,” that is, his own identity as an Irishman. Berkeleyan philosophy enabled Joyce to construct an epistemology appropriate to his own conception of authorship. In fact it is the only possible theoretical construct able to satisfy someone who could say that “[m]y art is not a mirror held up to nature. Nature mirrors my art” (JJI 690).

Notes


2. For a discussion of the different modes of realistic representation in fiction and a contrastive analysis of “conscious” realism and “conscientious” realism see an enlightening study by Damian Grant (Realism [London: Methuen, 1970]).

3. The concept of “metamind” has been formulated by Peter B. Lloyd (1999: http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/ty99.htm). Henceforth we shall use this term rather than Berkeley’s original “God,” since the former is devoid of theological connotations and implies more clearly Berkeley’s own idea of an all-encompassing “spirit” or “mind.”

4. James Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. J. A. Álvarez Amorós (Salamanca: Colegio de España, 1995) 320; henceforth to be parenthetically cited in the text.


8. Carens 309; on the different leitmotifs in *A Portrait* and their significance within the work as a whole see Carens.


10. In fact, the style and contents of the passage in general and these lines in particular bear a striking resemblance to St. John of the Cross’ “Noche Oscura del Alma,” especially the two final stanzas.


16. Weldon Thornton, *Allusions in Ulysses: An Annotated List* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1968) 42; for Aristotle’s own views see *On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath*, ed. and trans. W. S. Hett (London: Heinemann, 1936) 2: 418b-19a: “It is the colourless which is receptive of colour, as the soundless is of sound. The transparent is colourless, and so is the invisible or barely visible, such as the dark is held to be. This, then, is the nature of the transparent, when it is not actually transparent but potentially transparent; the same underlying nature is sometimes darkness and sometimes light.”


20. According to Plato, artists only provide reflections of the objects in the sensible world, which are themselves less real than the pure Ideas which alone have true existence. As Penelope Murray argues when discussing Plato’s ideas, since poets are imitators “they, like painters, are condemned to operate at the third level of reality, their products being nothing but worthless imitations of an imitation of reality” (*Plato on Poetry* [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996] 6). For Plato’s own discussion see *The Republic* (597e6-8, 600e4-5), Murray 77-95.

21. The contention that Joyce willingly held on to Berkeley’s philosophy to find a grounding for his art begs evidence. In fact, it is not just a critical invention come up with after a contrastive analysis. First, as we have noted in our own analysis and as Anghinetti claims, “Joyce makes ample reference, both directly and by allusion, to Berkeley the philosopher in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*” (317). Second, the systematic identification of Joyce’s artistic craft and Berkeley’s ideas share more aspects than mere coinidence would allow.